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The  paper  investigates  the  effects  of  Mergers  and  Acquisitions  (M&A)  on  corporate  research  and 
development  (R&D)  strategies  using  Community  Innovation  Survey  (CIS)  data  on  the  Dutch 
manufacturing sector. The focus of the research is whether M&A affect corporate innovation strategies, 
favouring in-house R&D and innovation expenses versus external technological sourcing. The results 
show that M&A activities have a positive and significant impact on innovation investments by firms, 
and  particularly  on  R&D  intensity  and  total  expenditure  on  innovation.  M&A  affect  corporate 
innovation  strategies,  favouring  in-house  R&D  versus  external  technological  sourcing.  Firm  post-
merger behaviour favours the consolidation of the knowledge, competences and capabilities that have 
been acquired by merging with or by buying another firm, confirming that the reasons for a merger or 
acquisition are most often related to firms’ innovative performance. Following involvement in a M&A, 
firms tend primarily to focus on fully integration of their resource bases in order to enable them to 
produce and sell innovative products that are new to the market 
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1. Introduction   
At the time of writing, it would seem that the peak of the 6
th wave of mergers in economic history 
has been reached, with numbers and values matching those achieved in the second half of the 1990s. 
While the current and the 4
th waves have been characterized by a great number of Leveraged Buy Outs 




rd waves were ‘normal’ merger 
waves, in the sense that most transactions concerned acquisitions by firms other than those active in 
private equity markets.  
While  it  has  been  shown  that  LBOs  have  negative  effects  on  both  capital  and  R&D  spending 
(Schenk, 2006), and take place for purely financial reasons and/or to capitalise on the target firms’ 
earlier acquisition errors, ‘normal’ mergers have sometimes been justified by the potentially beneficial 
effects of M&A on R&D and innovation activities. The results of most studies of the effects of M&A 
on innovation, however, are not encouraging perhaps in part because they generally focus on large, 
stockmarket quoted firms. But there are many thousands of smaller M&A occurring at national level, 
and it is possible—even likely—that the effects of these smaller transactions are quite different (Cefis 
et al., 2007). 
In addition, deteriorating or stagnating wealth creation after a merger is not a direct indication of 
what is happening in terms of the technology and studies have shown that the rationale for engaging in 
the M&A process has evolved over the years (De Man and Duysters, 2005), with innovation being an 
explicit reason for the last wave of mergers. These considerations must be set against a background of 
an increasingly “open innovation framework” (Chesbrough, 2006) and the  higher importance given to 
“external markets for technology” (Arora and Gambardella, 2001).  
Rapid technological change and world-wide increased competition have meant that innovation has 
become a critical element for firms to ensure economic performance and their survival in the market 
(Cefis and Marsili, 2006). However, these are also the factors that have led to a much higher emphasis 
on exploring external environments, market opportunities and knowledge sources beyond the firm’s 
boundaries. Corporate level managers acknowledge that in addition to the building of in-house R&D 
and  internal  capabilities  and  resources,  the  core  of  the  innovation  process  must  also  include 
identification, connection with and enhancement of external knowledge sources.   3 
However,  as  “innovation  greatly  differs  ...  in  terms  of  characteristics,  sources,  actors  involved, 
boundaries of the processes and the organization of innovative activities” (Malerba, 2005; p.67), the 
choice  of  innovation  strategy  is  rather  complex.  The  strategic  choice  and  the  pace  of  innovation 
investment is affected by factors endogenous to the firm – fit between innovation strategy and previous 
investments  in  distinct  dimensions  of  absorptive  capacity-  and  by  exogenous  factors  such  as 
appropriability conditions, market structure, uncertainty, threat of competitive entry or impact on future 
value of the firm (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2007). What is clear is that firm level innovative initiatives can 
no longer be regarded as stand-alone decisions; rather they should be seen as links in an interrelated 
innovation process chain that combines in-house growth and procurement of knowledge and external 
resources. 
Some of the recent literature highlights the complementarities versus the embedded substitutability 
approaches in firm level innovation choices (Cassiman and Veugelers,  2006; Catozzella  and Vivarelli, 
2007).  Whereas  in  the  past  the  relationship  between  in-house  and  external  sources  was  generally 
expected to be negative, it is now recognised that there are potential synergies and gains to be derived 
from the use of external sources, such as through M&A. Of course, the risks are higher and changes to 
firm  level  “dynamic  capabilities”  (Teece  et  al.,  1997)  are  required,  but  the  pay  offs  in  terms  of 
innovative performance may also be higher. 
These complementarities in firm level technology sourcing strategies are being emphasised by the 
changing rationale for M&A. Firms, and especially small and medium size enterprises (SME), are 
viewing M&A as mechanisms for learning and for acquiring resources, competences and capabilities 
from external sources of knowledge (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2007; 
Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Therefore, consistent in line with Cassiman et al. (2005; pag. 203), who state 
that “where innovation is itself the main reason of the M&A activity, the results can often be positive 
and sometimes extremely so”, we can expect that technology-driven M&A increase post merger in-
house R&D expenditures in order to absorb the new technology, knowledge and capabilities that have 
been acquired through the process of merging with or acquiring a new firm.  
The purpose of this study is to analyse how M&A change the technology sourcing strategies of the 
firms involved. The focus is on whether, following a M&A and the post merger integration process, 
firms are more likely to assimilate the acquired knowledge and resources and develop in-house R&D or 
to continue to buy the results of R&D in the market.   4 
This paper addresses the following specific questions: i) Do M&A have an impact on R&D intensity 
and on the total cost of innovation? ii) What, if any, are the effects of M&A on corporate R&D? Is in-
house R&D favoured over external R&D? iii) What is the capacity of these investments (internal and 
external) to generate new products and processes (R&D and innovation efficiencies) ? 
The empirical part of the analysis uses data for the Netherlands from the Community Innovation 
Surveys CIS2, CIS2.5, CIS3, and CIS3.5. These data were integrated with data from the Business 
Register database compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics/Statistics Netherlands (CBS), providing 
a comprehensive data set on innovation and M&A. 
The  results  of  this  study  show  that  M&A  activity  has  a  positive  and  significant  impact  on  the 
innovation  investments  made  by  firms,  especially  R&D  intensity.  M&A  seem  to  increase  internal 
R&D,  but  do  not  have  any  effect  on  R&D  outsourcing.  Also  M&A  seem  to  positively  affect  the 
acquisition of new machinery, but do not have an effect on expenditure on external knowledge such as 
purchase of patent rights, licences and other types of knowledge from third parties. 
These findings suggest  that post-merger behaviour favours the  consolidation of the knowledge, 
competences and capabilities acquired by merging with or buying another firm, confirming that M&A 
are  more  often  linked  to  innovative  performance,  than  other  objectives.  With  regard  to  R&D  and 
innovation cost efficiency in terms of products new to the firm, the results indicate that there are 
positive effects from M&A activity on firms’ dynamic efficiencies. Following an M&A a firm typically 
will tend to focus primarily on fully integrating resource-bases in order to be able to produce and sell 
innovative products that are new to the market.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the links between M&A and innovation 
and/or  R&D  sourcing  that  are  found  in  the  literature.  Sections  3,  4  and  5  respectively  provide 
descriptions of the data, and the dependent and independent variables, and introduce the methodology 
used for the research. The results are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 offers some conclusions. 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. The impact of M&A on R&D activity 
Assuming  rational  economic  behaviour,  firms  would  be  expected  to  undertake  a  merger  or 
acquisition  with  the  goal  of  either  raising  productivity  (lowering  costs)  and/or  creating  synergies.   5 
Alternatively,  M&A  might  be  carried  out  in  order  to  build  or  strengthen  monopoly  power.  Both 
behaviours are related to competitiveness. In this context, a merger or acquisition can have or not an 
effect on innovation depending on the nature of the M&A and on the innovative characteristics of the 
firms involved. 
De Man and Duysters (2005) cluster recent studies on the effects of M&A on corporate R&D and 
innovation performance into two main groups: those that have studied the conditions for M&A to have 
a positive effect on innovation performance and those that have considered the impact of M&A on 
proxies  of  R&D  activities.  The  conditions  facilitating  a  positive  effect  from  M&A  on  corporate 
innovation performance, include complementarities in resources (relatedness) (Cassiman et al., 2005), 
similar culture and management style (organisational fit) (Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002), post-merger integration and assimilation processes (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Epstein, 
2004; Cloodt et al., 2006). In terms of the effects on R&D activity and innovation effort, studies have 
shown that we need to take account of economies of scale and scope (Cefis et al., 2007; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996), both of which allow firms to gain competitive advantage and to keep abreast of the 
competition. 
Companies  should  strive  to  increase  research  expenditure  to  enable  them  to  profit  from  scale 
economies and to expand the number of R&D projects to profit from scope economies. Minimisation of 
costs  provides  another  incentive  for  companies  to  increase  R&D  productivity  in  order  to  increase 
innovation  output  per  euro  invested,  and  to  decrease  the  level  of  R&D  expenditure  for  a  given 
innovation  output.  With  the  exception  of  Ikeda  and  Doi  (1983),  empirical  studies  mainly  report 
negative effects of M&A on firms’ R&D efforts (de Man and Duysters, 2005; Hitt et al, 1991; Capron, 
1999). 
The present study aims to assess the effects of M&A on innovation taking R&D intensity, and the 
costs of innovation scaled by firm-size (including intramural and extramural R&D expenses, industrial 
design costs, investment in the acquisition of external knowledge - licences, copyright, trademarks, 
software), costs of market research for innovative products, staff training, etc.) as the two proxies for 
innovation inputs. 
The choice of innovation proxies is justified by the hypothesis, which I test later, that M&A could 
possibly lead to higher technology awareness, implying increased R&D efforts and thus R&D intensity 
and total innovation costs, followed by increased performance. This is based mainly on the fact that   6 
M&A are employed more and more as mechanisms for learning and acquiring resources, competences 
and  capabilities  from  knowledge  sources  beyond  the  firm’s  boundaries  (Veugelers  and  Cassiman, 
1999; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Ahuja and Katila, 2001).  
 
2.2 Effects of M&A on R&D “make or buy” strategies  
If  a  greater  emphasis  on  R&D  efforts  can  be  expected  as  a  result  of  the  M&A  process,  it  is 
important to investigate the extent to which M&A affects the decomposition of R&D expenditures 
within  the  firms.  Decomposing  the  structure  of  R&D  expenses  allows  to  analyse  whether  the 
proportion of internal versus external technology sourcing changes following a M&A process. 
Several papers (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2007) suggest that there 
are complementarities between in-house R&D and external technology sourcing, maintaining that it is 
these  complementarities  in  particular  that  allow  firms  to  attain  higher  innovative  performance. 
Focusing solely on one technology sourcing strategy - either accumulating in-house R&D, but not 
exploring the opportunities available on the market, or continuously buying technology in the market, 
but not assimilating the new knowledge – will lead to lower innovative performance (Cassiman and 
Veugelers,  2006).  
This view of complementarities and “supportive innovative activities” (Catozzella  and Vivarelli, 
2007) suggests a two way relationship between external and internal technology sourcing: that firms 
are able to use and assimilate external sourcing only after achieving a certain level of internal R&D and 
having developed absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), and simultaneously that investment 
in external sources of knowledge and technologies stimulates in-house innovative research (Veugelers, 
1997; Lokshin et al., 2008). 
This  study  focuses  on  the  latter  aspect.  Assuming  that  complementarities  exist  among  innovation 
activities, we would expect M&A to have two different effects on the proportion of resources devoted 
to internal versus external technology sourcing. The impact of these effects will vary according to the 
reasons for the M&A. If M&A are aimed at gaining market dominance (without any technological 
reasons)  then  they  cannot  be  expected  to  have  any  a  priori  effects  on  either  internal  or  external 
technology  sourcing.  Among  SMEs,  however,  M&A  are  often  driven  by  the  need  to  obtain  new 
knowledge,  technology,  and  capabilities  unavailable  to  the  acquiring  firm  due  to  lack  of  internal   7 
competencies. In this case, we should expect the M&A to have an effect on the composition of the 
technological sources; the merger or acquisition should be regarded as a “buy” strategy, since it is 
motivated by the desire to acquire new knowledge and technology.   
There  are  two  views  expressed  in  the  literature  on  the  possible  changes  to  the  allocation  of 
expenditure on in-house R&D following a M&A process. The first sees internal R&D and technology 
driven M&A as firm level innovation strategies that are substitutes; and thus a negative relationship is 
hypothesised (Basant and Fikkert, 1996; Bagues, 2004). The second seizes on the potential synergies 
deriving  from  the  M&A  process  and  predicts  a  possible  positive  effect  on  future  in-house  R&D 
development (Bloningen and Taylor, 1997; Lokshin et al., 2008; Belderbos et al., 2006). However, 
Ricart and Adegbesan (2007) suggest that to some extent this depends on the (rather vaguely defined) 
fit  between  a  firm’s  innovation  strategy  and  its  previous  investments  in  distinct  dimensions  of 
absorptive capacity. It would also seem to depend on the wealth that has been accumulated by the 
acquiring firm in the past.  
In line with the findings of Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) this study adopts the complementarities 
approach to studying firms’ “make or buy” investment decisions. Hence, given the complementarities 
among innovation activities, we should expect firms that have used M&A in the past as a way of 
acquiring  external  resources,  to  increase  in-house  R&D  efforts  in  order  to  fully  exploit  the  new 
technology, knowledge and capabilities acquired from exploring the “markets for technology”(Arora 
and Gambardella, 1994; Rosenberg, 1990). This strategy is based on a higher technology awareness: 
the externally acquired knowledge and technologies must be integrated and assimilated to enhance the 




3. The data 
 
The data set used for this study come from the Dutch CIS and ABR, which provide respectively 
firm  level  information  on  innovation  behaviour  and  technological  change  and  firm  specific 
demographic characteristics. Both data sources were made available by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) Netherlands.    8 
The CIS database gathers information on the extent and characteristics of firms’ innovation activity, 
technological performance and organizational change. In the Netherlands, the CIS is conducted on a 
two-yearly basis. Each wave covers the three year period prior to the survey. To date, firm level data 
from five CIS waves are available at the CBS, covering the period 1994-2004.   
In analysing the effects of M&A on firms R&D and innovation expenses structure, we allow for a 
post-acquisition integration period of three to five years following firms M&A involvement, which  
limited the time frame of the analysis to 1994-2002, covering the first four CIS waves (CIS 2, CIS 2.5, 
CIS 3 and CIS 3.5), but excluding CIS 4 because the previous wave, i.e. CIS 3.5, did not include a 
variable for firms’ M&A activity. 
The CIS target population includes a stratified sample
1 of private sector firms with at least 10 
employees, drawn from those present in the ABR. CIS2.5 and CIS3,  which were financed by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, include firms with 1-10 employees. In order to have comparable sample, 
for those waves I excluded firms with less than 10 employees. 
The second data source, ABR, supplies firm demographic information - firm age, size, industrial 
sector and nature of involvement in M&A activity. A schematic overview of the design of our panel is 
provided  in  Figure  1.  ABR  includes  the  industrial  sector  (at  the  5  digit  level),  size  (measured  by 
number of employees), and date of entry in and exit from the register. The integration of these data led 
to an unbalanced panel of 4,604 firm-level observations, from 1994 to 2002, which correspond to 2,913 
manufacturing firms.   
 
 
4. The variables 
 
Firms  are  favouring  M&A  as  channels  of  access  to  technology  and  incentives  for  innovative 
activities.  However,  assessing  M&A  processes  in  terms  of  firms’  ex-post  capabilities  to  manage 
innovation (firms’ dynamic efficiencies) is controversial. One aspect that is important is the way in 
which M&A affect the composition of R&D and the costs related to innovation. This study considers 
the  impact  of  M&A  on  firms’  technology  sourcing  strategies,  distinguishing  between:  i)  R&D 
                                                 
1 Firm size, industrial sectors and regions are used as stratifying variables   9 
expenditure  on  in-house  R&D,  and  external  R&D;  ii)  innovation  expenses  related  to  external 
knowledge  acquisition  (patents  and  licences),  acquisition  of  new  machinery  and  software,  market 
research  and  training  R&D  personnel  related  expenses;  and  iii)  capacity  of  these  investments  to 
generate new products and processes (R&D and innovation efficiencies). 
 
4.1 The selection model 
 
We can reasonably assume that firms decide to invest in innovative activities only if the foreseeable 
pay offs from doing so are significant and the risks associated with them are below a certain threshold. 
We  can  observe  firm  behaviour  (i.e.  level  of  R&D  expenditure,  or,  more  generally,  innovation 
investments) only for firms that have decided to invest in innovative activities over a certain threshold. 
Given this, I need to account for selectivity bias in the sample.
2 I introduced a selection model to 
explain the firm’s decision to invest in innovative  activities, which depends on firm-specific variables 
such as: financial and marketing constraints, and organizational, strategic and regulatory constraints 
perceived by companies as impeding their innovative activities. These are endogenous and exogenous 
factors to identify and capture the reasons affecting firms’ engaging or not in innovative activities, and 
their innovative performance. The first proxy - financial constraints – is a dummy variable  measuring 
the lack of financial resources required for engagement in innovative activities that takes the value 1 if 
the  company  replies  positively  to  the  question:  “Has  your  company  been  faced  with  financial 
constraints due to which innovation projects have not started?” The remaining proxies have a similar 
structure (1/0 dummies). The marketing constraints proxy captures whether firms have been reluctant 
to engage in innovative activities due to uncertain market development of new products. The internal 
organisational constraints dummy tests whether lack of innovation activity is due to inflexible firm 
organisational structures. Strategic constraints proxy tests whether the absence of innovative activities 
is due to uncertainty of outputs and future profits from innovation based on a lack of managerial, 
organisational  or  technological  capabilities  in  the  firm.  Finally,  the  regulatory  constraint  variable 
includes exogenous legislation (personnel, tax or environment related) that might affect innovative 
performance at firm level. 
                                                 
2 See Section 5 for a more detailed explanations of the two-stage Heckman model used to model R&D and innovation 
expenses.   10 
As  explanatory  variables  for  the  probability  of  investing  in  innovation,  I  included  firm 
characteristics such as size, age and technological regime (Pavitt categories), which have been proven 
to be relevant in shaping the innovative behaviour of firms (see among others Pavitt, 1984; Dosi, 1988; 
Breschi et al., 2002; Marsili and Verspagen, 2002; Cefis, 2003)    
 
4.2. The technology sources model 
 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Firm-level innovation activities require a broad spectrum of investments, ranging  from internal 
and/or external R&D expenditure to investments in new machinery, patents and licences, training and 
launching of a new product in the market. These investments can be categorised as: a) R&D related 
expenditure; and b) innovation expenses. 
The  CIS-ABR  panel  allows  me  to  analyse  these  technology  sourcing  indicators  and  their 
composition. I can also analyse the extent to which firms are able to derive dynamic efficiencies from 
the innovation process, by constructing R&D and innovation efficiency proxies. 
 
Decomposition of R&D Expenditure 
The distinction between internal and external R&D spending is very important in a post-acquisition 
technology sourcing study. Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) emphasise the complementarities between 
internal and external R&D, indicating that firms need both in order to attain the highest innovative 
performance. However, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) claim that firms need first to conduct internal 
R&D in order to be able to successfully integrate technology and knowledge bases produced outside 
the firm. Firms need to develop absorptive capacity internally before they can use externally sourced 
knowledge and technologies.  
In this study of firms’ technology sourcing strategies I examine the changes induced by the M&A 
process on the structure of R&D expenditure. In terms of R&D expenses (as well as the total costs 
related to innovation) M&A may motivate firms to i) make use of recently acquired knowledge bases 
and technological capacities and capitalise on internal technology assets through in-house R&D; ii) 
maintain a high level of external R&D spending on knowledge base and technological know-how from   11 
third parties or subcontractors; iii) combine internal and external R&D, taking maximum advantage of 
in-house technological investments and absorptive capacity. 
In order to test these hypotheses, I use, as proxies for the firm’s R&D engagement, firm total R&D 
expenses and the division between internal and external R&D spending.  Total R&D expenses includes 
all creative, systematic research directed towards innovation. It consists of investments and research 
related  expenses  in  R&D  projects,  and  the  costs  of  hiring  R&D  personnel.  The  division  between 
external/internal R&D refers to whether these activities are performed within the firm, or by employing 
subcontractors  or  third  parties  (including  specialists  on  temporary  contracts  to  work  on  a  specific 
innovation). These proxies are considered in relative terms to measure R&D intensity, calculated as 
ratios of R&D expenditures over total number of employees.  
 
Decomposition of Innovation Expenses 
R&D is only part of the innovation process; we also need to examine innovation investments which 
include all firm expenditure made to develop technologically new, or substantially improved, products, 
processes or services. Arrow (1962) stresses the distinction between R&D and innovation engagement, 
in his phrase the economic dilemma of R&D financing. Firms experience various gaps in financing for 
R&D activities especially due to the sunk cost nature of R&D expenses. This was confirmed by Hall 
(1999),  which  emphasises  that  this  gap  can  be  explained  by  the  reluctance  to  allocate  money  to 
research or knowledge and a far higher prevalence of financing physical assets (such as  machinery).  
The variable Innovation Expenses includes purchase of innovative machinery, computer hardware 
and software purchased specifically for realising an innovation, patents and licences, market research 
and  training  of  R&D  personnel.  I  decompose  it  considering  distinctly  two  proxies  for  innovation 
engagement: a) purchase of patent rights, licences or other types of knowledge from third parties, 
labelled “external innovation expenses”; b) acquisition of hardware/software and new machinery; plus 
the  costs of market research aimed directly at the market introduction of new products or services and 
R&D personnel training, labelled “in-house innovation expenses”. These proxies are also considered in 
relative terms, as innovation intensity, calculated as the ratio of innovation expenditure on total number 
of employees. 
   12 
R&D and Innovation Efficiencies 
We also need to analyse the impact of M&A processes on a firm’s capacity to create dynamic 
efficiencies.  Dynamic  efficiencies  are  aimed  at  generating  higher  levels  of  innovation.  They  are 
estimated as the ratio between a firm’s innovative outputs and inputs (from responses to the previous 
CIS). I consider innovative output only in terms of total firm sales due to new or significantly improved 
products, but allowing for two levels of novelty: products that are new or technologically improved for 
the firm; and products that are new or improved for the market. As proxies for innovative inputs I use 
total R&D expenses and total costs of innovation. Thus, four efficiency variables are constructed:  
1)   R&D efficiency in terms of products new to the market, as the ratio between total sales due to 
products new to the market at time t and total R&D expenses at time t-1, where t represents a 
specific CIS wave and t-1 the previous wave, thus allowing a lag of 2 years;  
2)   innovation cost efficiency in terms of products new to the market, as the ratio between total 
sales of products new to the market at time t and the total cost of innovation at  t-1;  
3)   R&D efficiency in terms of products new to the firm, as the ratio between total sales of products 
new to the firm at time t and total R&D expenses at time t-1;  
4)   innovation cost efficiency in terms of products new to the firm, as the ratio between total sales 
of products new to the firm at time t and the total cost of innovation at time t-1. 
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
Proxy for M&A  
The main interest in this study is to analyse the extent to which an M&A event influences the firm’s 
technology sourcing strategy. The impact of a merger or acquisition on a firm’s innovation-related 
sourcing strategies cannot be predicted easily, as it often depends on several technology and market 
related dimensions of the companies involved. 
Cassiman et al. (2005) and Cassiman and Colombo (2006) report positive and negative effects of 
M&A on innovation. The negative effects refer to decreases in R&D output and productivity following 
a merger, with merging companies rarely able to appropriate the scale and scope economies in R&D.   13 
However, there is also evidence of positive effects of M&A on firm R&D and innovative capacities: 
the  combination  of  knowledge  bases,  resources  and  technologies  allows  the  firm  to  develop  new 
knowledge, competences and capabilities that enable it to become a successful innovator. 
Using  a  case-study  approach,  Cassiman  and  Colombo  (2006)  find  evidence  that  efficient 
management  of  the  post-M&A  integration  process  can  lead  to  improved  innovative  performance 
despite a short-term weakening of R&D efforts and financing. This is also confirmed by Haspeslagh 
and Jemison (1991) and Jansen (2002), who stress the importance of a very well-planned post merger 
integration period to allow an efficient transfer of strategic capabilities from the target to the acquiring 
firm.  
As a proxy for M&A, I have chosen an indicator that shows whether or not the company has 
acquired another firm in the previous three years. I use the lagged value of this indicator in order to 
allow for a sufficiently long post-merger integration period. Accordingly, I allow for a 3-5 year time 
span following M&A activity in order to analyse the effects of a M&A in the previous CIS wave on 
firm innovation and R&D expenses, and the effectiveness of R&D and innovation input usage, as 
reported in the current CIS wave. 
 
Accounting for technological regimes and firm demographic characteristics 
In order to capture technology-specific conditions, in our model I include proxies to classify firms 
according to Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy. Four dummy variables have been constructed, classifying the 
sample into: science-based firms, specialized suppliers, scale intensive, and supplier dominated firms. 
The last category acts as reference category for the estimates. The Pavitt dummies are meant to capture 
and control for technological opportunity conditions (easier to innovate in certain fields than in others; 
possibly  industry-targeted  innovation  policies),  appropriability  conditions  and  organisational 
characteristics of the technology (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002). Teece (1986) stresses the importance 
of technological regime in selecting for internal versus external innovative strategies.  
Also important in an analysis of firm knowledge and technology sourcing strategies are firm size 
and  age.  Gopalakrishnan  and  Bierly  (2006)  found  evidence  that  both  age  and  size  influence  the 
relationship between firms’ knowledge sourcing strategies and innovative behaviour. Large firms are 
more likely to benefit from in-house R&D and from external technology sourcing, due to their higher   14 
absorptive capacity (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). Small firms may prove more innovation efficient 
due to their lower levels of bureaucracy and increased adaptability (Acs and Audretsch, 1987). In terms 
of  age,  younger  firms  seem  more  likely  than  older  firms  to  develop  and  maintain  connections  to 
sources  outside  the  firm  and  to  more  easily  appropriate  the  benefits  related  to  external  sourcing. 
However, both relationships are likely to show a non-linear trend. To account for this non-linearity, I 
introduce squared terms for the age and size proxies in our models.  
Firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of the number of employees as reported in the 
ABR files and age is calculated on the ABR dataset, as difference in months between the date of the 
CIS wave (December of the last year of the wave) and date of entry in the register (always expressed in 
logarithmic terms).   
 
5. Methodology  
 
The focus on structural differences in firm R&D and innovation expenses and cost-efficiencies 
implies the need for separate regression models to be estimated for each R&D and innovation proxy 
described above. The panel structure of our dataset allows us to model the changes observed in these 
proxies over time (1994-2002) and in particular circumstances (following an M&A event).  
Based on a number of influencing factors, firms make decisions about whether to invest money in 
R&D activities or development of innovative products, processes  and technologies. The R&D and 
innovation  investment  behaviour  of  firms  raises  some  methodological  concerns.  The  main  one  is 
selectivity The main issue is that of selectivity, analogous to the one that raises when estimating a 
labour supply function, where income data is only available for those active in the labour market (Love  
and  Roper,  2002;  Griffith  et  al.,  2006)).  Likewise,  we  can  only  observe  R&D  expenditure  and 
innovation costs for those firms that spend more than a certain amount on these activities (Crepon et 
al,. 1998; Benavente, 2006).  
Gonzalez and Pazo (2003) show that firms perform R&D and innovation activities only when their 
optimal  level  of  R&D  expenditure  surpasses  a  certain  threshold,  beneath  which  firms  would  be 
indifferent about performing R&D or not. That is, if: 






i i p p > ,where:   15 
*
i p  = the optimal price; 
*
i x =the optimal R&D expenditures; 
=
* *
i p the price the firm will set if it decides not to invest in R&D. 
Thus, although the amount of money invested in innovation and R&D may appear to be zero for 
many companies, this should be interpreted as their decision not to get involved in these activities, 
because they  consider it too risky, or too difficult given their internal  organisational structure  and 
internal  competences  and  capabilities  at  that  moment,  or  because  the  funds  at  their  disposal  are 
insufficient for involvement in innovation activities.   
To account for this, I estimate a two-stage Heckman model. The framework of a sample selection 
model allows for: (1) a Probit model for the firm’s decision to invest or not in innovation activities, 
estimating the sample selection term
3 l ; and (2) a model for the amount of funds the firm allocates to 
R&D and innovation, either internal or external, corrected for selectivity bias.   
The selection model can be written as: 
*
i i i z W' e a = +   
0 = i z if  0
* £ i z  
1 = i z  if  0
* > i z , 
where zi = the firm’s choice to invest in innovation activities,  and Wi is the set of the variables that 
explain the firm’s choice.  
The second model is an OLS regression estimating the expected value of y conditional on z=1 and 
other explanatory variables denoted by X. 
The specification of the OLS model is of the form: 
i i i u X y + = b '
*  
*
i i y y =  if  1 = i z ,  i y not observed if  i z =0. 
                                                 
3 l  expresses the effect of the unmeasured firms’ characteristics on firms’ innovation investment decision. In the Heckman 
2-stage model, the value of this factor is added as an additional proxy in the 2
nd stage - the OLS regression.   16 
where
*
i y  = the amount allocated by the firm to internal/external R&D and other innovation activities 
(either as global costs, or as disaggregated elements). 
The Heckman 2-stage estimator requires “exclusion restrictions” (Heckman,1979): i.e. variables 
that are likely to affect the probability of investing in innovation, but are unrelated (orthogonally) to the 
actual amount spent internally or externally by the firm on innovation-related activities. The selection 
function, therefore, includes a set of explanatory variables W, which include some X factors, but must 
also include additional factors that do not appear in X. In our selection model, the dependent variable is 
a dummy, indicating whether a firm has invested in innovation or not. This proxy is calculated taking 
account of the firm’s total innovation costs (including R&D expenses). If innovation costs are above 
zero, the firm is regarded to be a firm that has decided to invest in innovation, without differentiation of 
whether the investment is for internal or external innovative activity. If the total cost of innovation is 
zero,  or  the  question  in  the  CIS  questionnaire  has  no  response  (due  to  non-innovative  status, 
acknowledged in the response to the first CIS question), the firm is categorised as one that has decided 
not to invest in innovation. The independent variables are size, age, technological class, and a number 
of proxies that capture problems experienced by the firm, in the process of considering innovation 
activity, related to financial risk, market uncertainties, strategic/internal organizational problems or 
regulation  issues  that  in  any  way  impeded  or  affected  the  innovative  process  and  their  decision 
ultimately to invest/not invest in innovation. 
Thus, the selection model is estimated by:  
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10
it it it it it
it it it it
it it i
P(invest ) probit( fin_risk mkt _risk int_org regulations
strategic_risk age size scien based
special sup scale int )
b b b b
b b b b
b b n
= + + + +
+ + + + - +
+ - + - +
 
The second stage of the Heckman model, the OLS regression, captures the effects of previous M&A 
involvement on firm R&D and innovation expenditure, controlling for the firm’s demographic and 
technological specificities, and any selection bias. The following model was estimated using a pooled 
OLS estimator:  
 
1 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
it it it it i
i i i i
ln(tech_source) (M & A) age size scien based
special sup scale int
a b b b b
b b b l e
- = + + ++ + - +
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where λ is the Mills ratio capturing the sample selection bias estimated in the first stage using the 
Probit model. 
Sensitivity analysis  
The Heckman two-stage models have been estimated pooling together the data across CIS waves 
(t). As a sensitivity analysis to evaluate whether the results are robust to changes in the model, Random 
Effects models (RE) were estimated on the baseline specification used for the Heckman two-stage 
models. The RE allow  to exploit the panel structure of the data and time dummies are added as 
regressors. A time dummy for each CIS wave is included: d1998, d2000 and d2002 indicating the last 
year of each CIS wave. d2000 was chosen as the reference  year and, therefore, dropped from the 
regression. RE estimators were applied to the empirical models specified in Tables 5, 6, and 9; the 
results tables are included in the Appendix.  
Another part of the sensitivity analysis tests whether the results obtained with the Heckaman 2-
stage models are robust to a different hypothesis on the firm’s behaviour.  The new assumption is that 
the firm’s decision to invest in innovation (either internal or external)  is made simultaneously with the 
decision about of the amount to be invested in both type of investment. Given this assumption,  I 
estimate  Bivariate  Tobit  regression  models  for:  (1)  internal  R&D  expenditure  vs  external  R&D 
expenditure;  (2)  internal  innovation  expenses  (in  particular  for  acquiring  innovative  equipment)  vs 
external innovation expenses (e.g. for patents and licences). The Tobit regressions take into account the 
censured nature of R&D and innovation expenses data. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 The Univariate Analysis 
Univariate analyses were conducted on the individual CIS waves considered and on the complete 
CIS-ABR  panel.  Tables  1  and  3  present  descriptive  statistics  for  the  individual  CIS  waves,  while 
Tables 2 and 4 focus on the mean differences  between the two  groups of  firms: those previously 
involved in M&A activities and those not engaged in these kind of activities.  
Table 1 provides a general overview of the sample, categorising firms as M&A active or M&A non-
active. The average mean values of firm demographic characteristics (age and size) are calculated for 
the complete panel. Values of firm size proxies (number of employees and total sales) as well as firm   18 
age (in months) are presented for both categories of firms, to reflect their potential importance in an 
investigation of post-M&A technology sourcing strategies at firm-level. The mean values for firm size 
(regardless of whether I use total sales or number of employees as the proxy) are clearly larger for 
firms previously involved in M&A. Thus, in the multivariate analysis I control for size and age by 
inserting  these  proxies  in  the  model  and  by  considering  all  dependent  variables  in  relative  terms, 
namely scaled by firm size. 
-------- Insert Table 1 around here ----------- 
Tables  2  and  3  present  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  dependent  proxies  used  to  model  the 
decomposition of total R&D expenditure and total innovation expenses.  Table 2 displays firm-level 
technology  sourcing variables across CIS  waves while Table 3  gives the averaged image of these 
proxies across the complete CIS-ABR panel, both Tables providing  the distinction between M&A 
active and non-active firms 
Table 2 shows that the mean of the variables of interest is fairly stable across CIS waves. The only 
proxies showing a different trend are firm total innovation expenses and expenditure on acquisition of 
machinery. The former figure includes the latter item, suggesting that the cause of the sudden decrease 
in total innovation expenses at firm level can be explained by the decrease in expenditure on machinery 
acquisition,  which  can  be  considered  our  most  pro-cycle  variables.  Indeed,  we  see  that  expenses 
involved in the acquisition of machinery were at their lowest in the last CIS wave considered (CIS 3.5) 
in our analysis, covering the time period 2000-2002. During these three years, the Dutch economy was 
experiencing a recession, which was at its lowest in 2002 (CPB’s Economic Outlook, Report 2003/1). 
-------- Insert Table 2 around here ----------- 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the same R&D and innovation technology sourcing 
proxies, averaged along our CIS-ABR panel. It presents the means for firm R&D expenses and total 
innovation costs, as well as their decomposition proxies, distinguishing between M&A and non M&A 
active firms. Generally, M&A active firms show higher means than their non-active counterparts and 
the difference is significant. This suggests that M&A active firms invest and spend more on R&D and 
innovation related activities than M&A non active firms. It shows that the difference between the two 
groups is significant for the total R&D expenses proxy and for the in-house R&D proxy, while not 
significant for the external R&D proxy (R&D performed by third parties). It seems that there are no 
differences between M&A and non-M&A firms when they decide to outsource their R&D activities.   19 
The  difference  between  means  is  not  significant  for  the  proxies  denoting  total  expenditure  due  to 
acquisition  of  machinery  and  firm  market  and  personnel  innovation  related  expenses  (including 
marketing activities aimed directly at the introduction of new products or services to the market and 
training costs for R&D personnel).  
It should be noted that the higher mean values, in terms of R&D intensities or innovation expenses 
scaled by size, registered by firms involved in M&A, as shown in Table 3, are not the result of an 
accounting artefact arising from the fact that firms have been merged or acquired. The statistics are 
calculated for firms that have been M&A active for 3-5 years before the year of the statistics, thus 
allowing a post-merger integration period that should eliminate or at least considerably reduce any 
accounting distortion. 
-------- Insert Table 3 around here ----------- 
The panel-level descriptive statistics allow to identify whether most of the variation in the sample is 
between  firms  or  across  firms  over  time.  The  results  suggest  that  most  of  the  total  variation  is 
accounted for by the between firms variation, which is one of the justifications for the choice of model 
estimation technique for the multivariate analysis.  
 
6.2. The Multivariate Analysis 
As a first step, we look at the effects of M&A on total R&D expenses and on the decomposition 
between R&D performed in-house and external R&D (see Tables 4-6). The results of the selection 
equation are presented in Table 4. Strategy constraints, namely uncertainty of outputs and future profits 
deriving  from  innovation  due  particularly  to  lack  of  managerial,  organisational  and  technological 
capabilities in the firm, is the only proxy that has a significant effect on the firm’s investment decision, 
when controlling for other factors. It seems that what really matters in the firm’s decision to invest in 
innovative  activities  is  the  certainty  that  it  has  the  managerial,  organisational  and  technological  
resources needed for innovation. Other constraints play a less important role. 
-------- Insert Table 4 around here ----------- 
Considering the decomposition of R&D expenditure (Table 5), M&A seem to positively affect total 
R&D expenses scaled by the number of employees, that is R&D intensity. In particular, the amount of 
R&D performed by the firm’s own personnel increases after a merger or acquisition. This result does   20 
not derive solely from the post-M&A integration process or the accounting distortions that can occur 
following a M&A because I allowed for a 3-5 year lag (from the time of the M&A to the time that the 
data on R&D and innovation expenses were collected) for these events. Thus, M&A seem to foster 
innovation through the direct channel of the R&D resources invested inside the firm. 
-------- Insert Table 5 around here ----------- 
If we consider a more comprehensive proxy than R&D expenses, i.e. the variable that measures all 
the costs involved in innovation (total innovation expenses), the previous results are confirmed. Table 6 
presents the coefficient estimates of the regressions run on total innovation expenses (from which R&D 
expenses have been subtracted) and on some of its components divided into expenses for developing 
innovations internally or externally. The investments made by the firm to enhance innovation activities 
within the firm include the costs of acquiring innovative machinery, computer hardware and software 
specifically purchased for realising innovations, market research for launching new products, training 
of internal personnel in the use of innovative machinery or applying a new production process. The 
innovation investments external to the firm include financing the development of innovations by third 
parties,  acquisition  of  external  knowledge  such  as  patents,  licences,  copy-right,  etc.,  and  market 
research for launching new products conducted by third parties.  
M&A performed 3-5 years earlier have a positive and significant effect on a firm’s total innovation 
expenses  (excluding  R&D  expenses).  The  estimates  show  that  M&A  play  a  significant  role  in 
increasing expenditure on innovation inside the firm, including acquisition of new types of machinery 
or  software,    marketing  activities  for  launching  new  products,  and  training  of  R&D  personnel. 
Consistent with the R&D results, Table 6 shows that M&A do not significantly affect spending on 
outsourcing of innovation activities and acquisition of external knowledge. M&A seem not to enhance 
the purchase of rights to use patents, licences or other types of knowledge from third parties. It could be 
argued that it is the merger or acquisition that is the means of accessing external knowledge and, 
therefore, that the firm’s post-merger behaviour favours consolidation of the knowledge that has been 
acquired by merging with or buying another firm. As a consequence, we should see an increase in 
expenditure to enhance the consolidation of the knowledge and, more generally, of the competences 
and capabilities that the firm acquires through the M&A process. This interpretation, sustained by this 
empirical analysis, would support the argument that M&A are more often performed for reasons linked 
to innovative performance, than other reasons.    21 
-------- Insert Table 6 around here ----------- 
These  results  are  confirmed  if  we  assume  that  the  firm’s  decision  to  invest  in  internally  or 
externally  driven  innovation  is  made  simultaneously  with  the  decision  about  how  much  will  be 
invested. The estimates of the Bivariate Tobit models are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 shows 
the results of the regression when considering the simultaneous choice between expenditure on internal 
R&D and external R&D. The results confirm the previous findings that following a M&A process 
firms seem to invest more in in-house R&D than in outsourcing of R&D to third parties. The results in 
Table 8 also show that M&A seem to favour firm investment in internal innovation expenditure (in 
particular  the  costs  of  acquiring  innovative  machinery)  rather  than  exploring  market  opportunities 
(investing in  patents and licences).
4  
-------- Insert Tables 7 - 8 around here ----------- 
Table 9 completes the investigation of M&A effects on corporate strategies for R&D investment by 
considering efficiency: the firm’s capacity to transform R&D and innovation investments into valuable 
innovative outputs, namely products new to the firm and new to the market. Here we are assessing both 
changes in the firm’s technology sourcing strategies as well as the extent to which these changes have 
proven beneficial in terms of dynamic efficiencies.  
For R&D and innovation cost efficiencies related to products new to the firm, the estimates indicate 
a  negative  effect  of  a  M&A  involvement  on  the  firm’s  capacity  to  derive  dynamic  efficiencies. 
However, for the second group of efficiency proxies, namely R&D and innovation cost efficiencies in 
terms  of  products  that  are  new  or  significantly  improved  for  the  market,  the  estimates  indicate  a 
positive effect of M&A involvement. 
This would suggest that besides contributing to an increase in firm in-house R&D potential and 
absorptive capacity of external R&D, M&A also enable firms to derive valuable gains in terms of firm-
level innovativeness. The results seem to point to the fact that firms involved in M&A processes are 
more efficient in terms of being able to introduce products and services that are new to the market. 
These results show that M&A play an important role in increasing the radical innovativeness of the 
firms,  and  support  the  argument  according  that  following  a  M&A  process  firms  combine  their 
knowledge bases, competences and technologies, enhancing the ability to produce products new to the 
                                                 
4 Additional results showing the distinction among acquisition of new machinery and the purchase of licences or copy rights 
are available on request.   22 
market, i.e. products that do not merely imitate existing products (products new to the firm but not to 
the market, columns 1 and 3 in Table 9).  
 -------- Insert Table 9 around here ----------- 
Finally, the Appendix reports the results of the sensitivity analysis. In order to check whether the 
results obtained are robust to changes in the model, we estimated all the models in Tables 5, 6, and 9 
using a RE estimator and exploiting the panel structure of the data (including year dummies). The 
results for the main variable of interest,  M&A  (t-1), do not change qualitatively: the sign and the 
significance  of  the  coefficients  is  consistently  the  same  and  the  magnitude  does  not  change 
significantly. In considering the effects of M&A on R&D and innovation expenses (Tables 5a and 6a), 
the proxies for technological regimes or Pavitt categories, become positive and significant at 1%, while 
in  the  Heckman  models  they  were  generally  less  significant.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  efficiency 
models  (Table  9a),  Pavitt  proxies  are  all  non-significant.  The  time  dummies  in  general  are  very 





The results reported in this paper suggest that M&A activity has a positive and significant impact 
on firms’ innovation investments. In particular, M&A seem to foster innovation through the direct 
channel of R&D resources invested inside the firm. Firms  that have experienced a M&A do not seem 
to invest more than before in external R&D, but they do invest more in in-house R&D.  
Similarly, M&A that took place 3-5 years earlier have a positive and significant effect on a firm’s 
total  innovation  expenditure.  The  estimates  show  that  M&A  have  a  significant  role  in  increasing 
expenditure on the acquisition of new types of machinery or software, marketing activities, and the 
training of R&D personnel. M&A do not significantly affect expenditure on external knowledge, such 
as purchase patent rights, licences or other types of external knowledge. 
It could be argued that M&A are a means of acquiring external knowledge and, therefore, that post-
merger behaviour favours the consolidation of the knowledge that has been acquired by merging with 
or by buying another firm. As a consequence, there is an increase in expenditure on the consolidation 
of new knowledge and integration of the competences and capabilities the firm has acquired through   23 
the  M&A  process.  This  interpretation,  confirmed  by  the  empirical  analysis,  would  support  the 
argument that M&A are generally linked to improving innovation performance. 
Concerning R&D and innovation cost efficiencies in terms of sales of new products, the estimates 
indicate positive effects from M&A involvement on firms’ capacity to derive dynamic efficiencies. 
This seems to suggest that as well as contributing to an increase in in-house R&D, M&A stimulate 
firms to achieve gains in firm-level innovativeness. Following M&A involvement, firms tend primarily 
to focus on fully integrating their resource bases in order to be able to produce and sell innovative 
products that are new to the market. The development of new products based on researching market 
needs and producing market novelties, seem to be the main focus of firms seem  to be the main focus of 
firms  that  through  a  M&A  process  have  acquired  the  necessary  technological  and  organizational 
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Table 1: General overview of manufacturing  firms 
split by involvement in M&A transactions 
                      M&A ACTIVE FIRMS     M&A NON ACTIVE FIRMS
Variable Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Firms number of employees Overall 464.01 1957.3 165.7 494.6
Between 2027.7 510.9
Within 165.7 156.7
Firms total sales Overall 173354.7 497458.4 71166.5 356233.5
(thousand of euro) Between 477190.2 313117.7
Within 25148.2 146993.6
Firms age Overall 385.3 298.5 370.4 271.5
(expressed in months) Between 300.2 267.4
Within 6.23 17.13
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the dependent variables  across CIS waves 
 
 
Variable  CIS wave Mean  Median Skewness Kurtosis 25th percentile 75th percentile
Total R&D expenses CIS 2.5 2.47 0 14.8 292.7 0 0
(thousand euros per employee) CIS 3 2.89 0 16.9 430.8 0 0
CIS 3.5 3.13 0 35.3 1457.5 0 2.2
Total R&D expenses CIS 2.5 2.18 0 15.5 319.5 0 0
with own personnel CIS 3 3.53 0 12.4 266.8 0 2.33
(thousand euros per employee) CIS 3.5 2.56 0 21.8 625.1 0 2.004
Total R&D expenses CIS 2.5 1.25 0 15.7 283.02 0 0
performed by third parties CIS 3 1.52 0 14.4 262.01 0 0
(thousand euros per employee) CIS 3.5 1.47 0 49.6 2588.8 0 0
Total expenses for  CIS 2.5 10.19 1.49 56.9 3460.8 0 6.89
innovation CIS 3 7.16 0 27.13 1078.1 0 5.47
(thousand euros per employee) CIS 3.5 4.14 0 34.06 1480.5 0 3.44
Expenditures in other   CIS 2.5 1.09 0 19.15 508.3 0 0
external knowledge CIS 3 1.1 0 22.77 656.8 0 0
(purchase of licenses) CIS 3.5 1.05 0 14.06 269.9 0 0
(thousand euros per employee)
Expenditures in acquisition  CIS 2.5 5.53 0 63.7 4133.7 0 1.49
of machinery CIS 3 3.36 0 22.25 748.05 0 1.009
(thousand euros per employee) CIS 3.5 1.85 0 10.47 149.3 0 1.04
Other innovation expenditures  CIS 2.5 1.8 0 14.6 321.6 0 1.4
(technical preparation of production 
process, training of personnel, 
marketing activities)
CIS 3 1.64 0 51.8 2874.3 0 0




   30 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics grouped  by M&A active and NON-active firms 
                      M&A ACTIVE FIRMS    M&A NON ACTIVE FIRMS
MEAN
Variable Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. DIFFERENCE
TEST
Total R&D expenses Overall 5.7 16.2 4.34 17.8
(thousand euros per employee) Between 16.1 11.8 -1,44**
Within 4.3 11.7
Total R&D expenses Overall 5.05 13.2 3.68 10.9 -2,36***
with own personnel Between 13.08 8.5
(thousand euros per employee) Within 3.56 6.3
Total R&D expenses Overall 1.74 3.47 1.72 8.7 0.05
performed by third parties Between 3.5 6.5
(thousand euros per employee) Within 0.74 4.4
Total expenses for  Overall 9.62 19.5 7.69 28.26 -1,35**
innovation Between 19.4 27.53
(thousand euros per employee) Within 2.4 13.44
Expenditures in other  
external knowledge Overall 1.13 0.77 1.07 0.45 -2.14***
(purchase of licenses) Between 0.8 0.42
(thousand euros per employee) Within 0.11 0.23
Expenditures in acquisition  Overall 2.81 5.77 3.26 12.7 0.7
of machinery Between 5.75 13.5
(thousand euros per employee) Within 1.6 5.23
Other innovation expenditures  Overall 1.58 1.8 1.55 10.3 -0,06
(technical preparation of 





(thousand euros per employee) Within 0.56 0.95
 
         Note: statistically significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level 
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Table 4: The selection equation. 





















LRc c c c²(10) 2077.29***
Pseudo R² 0.238
Log-likelihood -3332.633
Number of observations 10028
Firms decision to invest  in 
innovative activities
SELECTION EQUATION
Note: Standard  error in parantheses; statistically significant at: *** 1% level; 
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Table 5: The effects of M&As on firms R&D expenses. Heckman 2-stage estimator
Coef. Coef. Coef.
(std. error) (std. error) (std. error)
M&As (t-1) 0,201** 0,203** 0.272
(0,107) (0,11) (0,2)
Science-based firms 1,002*** 0,98*** 0,48**
(0,150) (0,15) (0,28)
Specialized suppliers 0,231** 0.16 0,29*
(0,113) (0,1) (0,21)
Scale-intensive firms 0,82*** 0,8*** 0,64***
(0,146) (0,14) (0,27)
Size -0,05 -0,07 0.127
(0,054) (0,07) (0,1)
Age -0,173*** -0,16*** -0,3***
(0,05) (0,05) (0,09)
Constant 2,19*** 2,2*** -1,5
(0,84) (0,83) (1,55)
Mills (λ) 0,28** 0,31* 0,2**
(0,19) (0,19) (0,3)
Rho 0.2 0.22 0.17
Wald c c c c² 1417,67*** 1415,2*** 1285,08***
Number of observations 10028 10028 10028
                                                                                                           Note: Standard  error in parantheses; statistically significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level




Total R&D expenses 
performed by third 
parties
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Table 6: The effects of M&As on firm Innovation Expenses. Heckman 2-stage estimator






(performed by third 
parties)
Coef. Coef. Coef.
(std. error) (std. error) (std. error)
M&As (t-1) 0,174* 0,336* 0.122
(0,107) (0,203) (0,24)
Science-based firms 0,56*** 0,973*** 0,7***
(0,148) (0,08) (0,024)
Specialized suppliers -0,1 0,22*** 0,27*
(0,11) (0,08) (0,2)
Scale-intensive firms 0,58*** 0,71*** 0,36*
(0,144) (0,09) (0,25)
Size -0,15 0,69*** 0,63***
(0,073) (0,6) (0,1)
Age -0,157*** -0,36 -0,09
(0,049) (0,37) (0,09)
Constant -2,6*** 0.9 0.76
(0,83) (1,03) (1,2)
Mills (λ) 0,26* 0,8*** 0.1
(0,19) (0,28) -0.24
Rho 0.19 0.27 0.06
Wald c c c c² 1384,5*** 1285,08*** 489,7***
Number of observations 10022 10022 10022
                                                                                                           Note: Standard  error in parantheses; statistically significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level    34 
Table 7: Effects of M&As on the decomposition of R&D expenses
                BiTobit estimator. 
Total in-house Total external
R&D expenses R&D expenses
Coef. Coef.
(std. error) (std. error)
Merged in t-1 0,253** 0.316
(0,110) (0,2)
Science-based firms 0,95*** 0.236
(0,105) (0,193)
Specialized suppliers -0,018 -0,003
(0,105) (0,193)








Wald c c c c² 231,04*** 231,04***
Number of observations 3578 3578
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Table 8: The effects of M&As on the decomposition of Innovation Expenses
                 BiTobit estimator 
Coef. Coef.
(std. error) (std. error)
M&As (t-1) 0.04 -0,02
(0,06) (0,013)
Science-based firms 0,43*** -0,024**
(0,05) (0,01)
Specialized suppliers 0.004 -0,02
(0,05) (0,01)








Wald c c c c² 203,02*** 203.02***
Number of observations 3578 3578
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Table 9: The effects of M&As on firm R&D and innovation efficiencies 
Dependent Variable:
R&D efficiency in 
terms of new 
products for the firm
R&D efficiency in 
terms of new 
products for the 
market
Innovation cost 
efficiency in terms of 
new products for the 
firm
Innovation cost 
efficiency in terms of 
new products for the 
market
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(std. error) (std. error) (std. error) (std. error)
M&As (t-1) -1,480*** 0.842** -1,291*** 0,967***
(0,408) (0,349) (0,404) (0,374)
Science-based firms 0,238 -1,973*** -1,425** -4,055***
(0,630) (0,594) (0,584) (0,679)
Specialized suppliers 0,025 -0,963** -0,569 -1,675***
(0,476) (0,406) (0,436) (0,471)
Scale-intensive firms 0,085 -1,564*** -1,410** -3,647***
(0,616) (0,583) (0,565) (0,650)
Size 0.690** -0.751** -0,532* -1.920***
(0,293) (0,313) (0,285) (0,343)
Age 0,511*** -0,443** -0,027 -1,074***
(0,196) (0,193) (0,190) (0,214)
Constant -4,038 14,415*** 10,282*** -29,865***
(3.367) (3,635) (3,206) (3,865)
Mills (λ) 0,435 -4,140*** -2,344*** 7.481***
(0,747) (0,834) (0,743) (0,896)
Rho 0.091 -0,775 -0.436 -0.971
Sigma 4.758 5.345 5.377 7.704
Wald chi2 1126,51*** 1165,54*** 1231,11*** 1268,84***
Observation 9673 9819 9958 9967
















(std. error) (std. error) (std. error)
M&As (t-1) 0,216* 0,183* 0,038
(0,123) (0,097) (0,078)
Size -0,067* -0,106*** -0,398***
(0,037) (0,034) (0,026)
Age 0,027 -0,045 -0,095***
(0,055) (0,045) (0,038)
Science-based firms  1,812*** 1,133*** 0,745***
(0,128) (0,110) (0,087)
Specialized suppliers  0,713*** 0,300*** 0,372***
(0,116) (0,109) (0,078)
Scale-intensive firms  1,688*** 0,911*** 0,753***
(0,135) (0,116) (0,091)
d1998 -0,323*** 0,193*** -0,151***
(0,073) (0,052) (0,062)
d2002 0,336*** -0,651*** -0,076
(0,079) (0,047) (0,067)
Constant -3,066*** 1,126*** -1,540***
(0,355) (0,309) (0,245)
R-squared (overall) 0,086 0,182 0,066
Wald chi2 348,85*** 468,05*** 365,20***
Number of observations 4604 2574 4382
                                                                                                           Note: Standard  error in parantheses; statistically significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level
Table 5.a: The effects of M&As on firms R&D input.  




Total R&D expenses 
with own personnel
Total R&D expenses 
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within the firm 
(internally)
Innovation Expenses 
performed by third 
parties (externally)
Coef. Coef. Coef.
(std. error) (std. error) (std. error)
M&As (t-1) 0,418*** 0,098* 0,010
(0,132) (0,052) (0,026)
Size 0,217*** 0,160*** 0,082***
(0,039) (0,016) (0,007)
Age 0,011 -0,007 -0,025**
(0,058) (0,023) (0,010)
Science-based firms  1,656*** 0,648*** 0,211***
(0,134) (0,054) (0,023)
Specialized suppliers  0,511*** 0,098** 0,067***
(0,121) (0,049) (0,020)
Scale-intensive firms  1,376*** 0,427*** 0,178***
(0,141) (0,057) (0,024)
d1998 0,544*** 0,195*** -0,024
(0,079) (0,031) (0,016)
d2002 -0,513*** -0,290*** -0,059***
(0,086) (0,033) (0,018)
Constant -2,618*** 0,093 -0,101
(0,372) (0,150) (0,064)
R-squared (overall) 0,094 0,119 0,074
Wald chi2 381,38*** 478,19*** 277,07***
Number of observations 4604 4604 4604
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Table 9.a: The effects of M&As on firms R&D and innovation efficiencies.  
                  Random Effects estimator
Dependent Variable:
R&D efficiency in 
terms of new 
products for the 
firm
R&D efficiency in terms 
of new products for the 
market
Innovation cost 
efficiency in terms of 




terms of new 
products for the 
market
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(std. error) (std. error) (std. error) (std. error)
M&As (t-1) -0,298*** 0,347*** -0,114*** 0,155***
(0,059) (0,075) (0,040) (0,054)
Size 0,028** 0,018 0,017* 0,020
(0,014) (0,018) (0,010) (0,013)
Age 0,044*** 0,023 0,029*** 0,025**
(0,012) (0,015) (0,008) (0,011)
Science-based firms  -0,017 0,097* -0,035 0,051
(0,043) (0,054) (0,029) (0,039)
Specialized suppliers  -0,016 0,063 -0,003 0,054*
(0,036) (0,046) (0,025) (0,033)
Scale-intensive firms  0,003 0,005 -0,031 -0,001
(0,051) (0,064) (0,035) (0,046)
d1998 -0,514*** -0,857*** -0,130*** -0,562***
(0,036) (0,045) (0,024) (0,033)
d2002 0,239*** -0,640*** 0,282*** -0,435***
(0,039) (0,049) (0,027) (0,035)
Constant 0,117 0,575*** -0,111 0,281***
(0,102) (0,130) (0,069) (0,093)
R-squared (overall) 0,237 0,202 0,154 0,175
Wald chi2 510,46*** 415,53*** 300,28*** 349,09***
Number of observations 3021 3021 3021 3021
                                                                                                      Note: Standard  error in parantheses; statistically significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 